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Abstract— This paper proposes an adaptive watermarking 
technique by modulating some closed cones in an originally 
optimized logic network (master design) for technology mapping. 
The headroom of each disjoint closed cone is evaluated based on its 
slack and slack sustainability. The notion of slack sustainability in 
conjunction with an embedding threshold enables closed cones in 
the critical path to be qualified as watermark hosts if their slacks 
can be better preserved upon remapping. The watermark is 
embedded by remapping only qualified disjoint closed cones 
randomly selected and templates constrained by the signature. This 
parametric formulation provides a means to capitalize on the 
headroom of a design to increase the signature length or strengthen 
the watermark resilience. With the master design, the 
watermarked design can be authenticated as in non-oblivious 
media watermarking. Experimental results show that the design 
can be marked efficiently by our method with low overhead. 
 
Index Terms — Digital Watermarking, IP Protection, 
Incremental Technology Mapping, Logic Synthesis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increase in integrated circuit complexity and shorter 
design turnaround time have boosted reuse-based design 
methodology to speed up new product development in the 
System-on-Chip (SoC) era. Although significant time and effort 
have been invested in the creation of reusable intellectual 
property (IP) cores, piracy extorts sizable revenue from IP 
producers and poses a severe threat to reusable design. Digital 
watermarking has evolved as a mature technology to protect the 
copyright of multimedia content [1]. When this technique is 
applied to VLSI design [2]-[15], it augments the IP owner’s 
opportunity to reclaim his loss of revenue. The imperceptibility 
of multimedia watermark stems from the imperfection of human 
sensory system. In contrast, watermarking for IP protection (IPP) 
imposes that the watermarked IP must also remain functionally 
correct. The transparency of IP watermarking is achieved by 
making the changes induced by the watermark ‘invisible’ to an 
experienced designer so that they could not be easily detected. 
At the same time, the cost and performance (quality) of the 
watermarked IP shall not be unduly compromised. The 
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watermarked IP should also be resilient to malicious attacks 
without deteriorating the design functionality and performance 
to an extent that renders the design unusable.  
 Modern VLSI design flow involves many optimization 
procedures that require solving various NP-hard constraint 
satisfaction problems (CSP). The solution space of these 
problems is normally enormous. Exploitation of the excess 
solution space of CSP has led to the first work in 
constraint-based watermarking for IPP by Lach et al. [3], [4] 
and Hong and Potkonjak [5], which was later formally 
articulated in [6], [7]. In this approach, the ownership credibility 
is determined by the probability of coincidence, Pc [8]. The 
proof requires revoking the CSP instance to demonstrate that the 
additional constraints are satisfied by the watermarked design. 
This process tends to expose the signature and secrecy of the 
well-formed grammar used to generate the constraints, making 
other similarly marked designs vulnerable to attacks. Except 
some local watermarking schemes [9], [10], [13], [14], all 
watermark bits in global watermarking are closely coupled into a 
set of design constraints, which cannot be independently 
extracted to detect the locality of design changes due to partial 
obliteration. 
This paper presents a new constraint-based watermarking 
technique at logic synthesis level [14]. Instead of passively 
accepting the success or failure until the watermarking is 
completed, we use an originally optimized design to extract the 
excess bandwidth relative to the original timing specifications. 
Unlike other logic synthesis watermarking [9], [10], where the 
watermarked solution quality is limited by the technology 
mapping of overlapping maximum cones, we introduce 
independent disjoint closed cones for incremental technology 
mapping to maximally exploit the excess bandwidth. As timing 
criticality is obscure in a small disjoint closed cone, a slack 
sustainability is formally defined to determine its headroom for 
remapping. Using both slack and slack sustainability to qualify 
cones for remapping prevents the watermark bits from being 
conspicuously hosted in only the non-critical paths. This 
incremental mapping preserves as much optimality of the master 
design and can provide a well-defined control mechanism to 
trade the embedded capacity for a bounded overhead. To avoid 
the exposure of the grammar for constraints generation, an 
alternative verification analogous to the watermark retrieval of 
non-oblivious image watermarking is made possible by our 
embedding method. This watermark retrieval method also 
possesses some degree of fragility that enables the detection of 
maliciously corrupted watermark bits.  
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II. PRELIMINARIES 
A bound logic network can be represented as a directed 
acyclic graph (DAG), G(V, E) where each node, v ∈ V represents 
an instance of a cell library. A directed edge, ei, j ∈ E exists if ∃vi, 
vj ∈ V such that the output of cell vi is an input of cell vj. The sets 
of fanin and fanout nodes of vj are denoted by FI(vj) and FO(vi), 
respectively. A primary input/output (PI/PO) has no fanin/fanout 
node. A cone at node v, denoted as Cv, is defined as a subgraph 
consisting of v and at least one of its predecessors. If all the 
predecessors of v are contained in the cone, Cv is called the max 
cone at v [16].  
The set of nodes outside Cv which drive the nodes (or are 
driven by the nodes) in Cv will be denoted by FI(Cv) (or FO(Cv)). 
Any node in Cv that drives (is driven by) at least a node outside 
Cv or a PO (PI) is called the output (input) node of Cv. Cv is a 
simple cone if it has only one output node, v. Any output node of 
Cv that drives at least one internal nodes in Cv, if it exists, is 
known as an implicit output node. A cone is closed if it has no 
implicit output nodes. If a cone contains any implicit output node, 
it is said to be open. A complex cone, Cv1,v2,…,vn = Cv1 ∪ Cv2 ∪ … 
∪ Cvn is a conjunction of two or more connected cones with at 
least one common transitive fanin nodes between any two cones. 
A simple open cone can be made closed by either excluding all 
its implicit output nodes, or including the transitive fanin and 
fanout nodes of the implicit output nodes until the complex cone 
so formed contains no implicit output node. The distance, d(v, u) 
is the minimum number of transitive edges connecting nodes u 
and v. The distance, d(C) is defined as the maximum distance 
among all pairs of input and output nodes of cone, C.  
 Fig. 1 shows the DAG of a technology mapped network. 
Node u is an implicit output node of Cv as it drives an internal 
node t. By definition, Cv is a distance-2 open simple cone due to 
d(p, v) = 2 and node u.  Cv’ is a closed cone obtained by 
eliminating u from Cv. Cv,x is a closed complex cone obtained by 




Figure 1: Examples of a DAG network, a max cone (MCv), a closed cone (Cv’), 
an open cone (Cv), and a complex cone (Cv,x). 
 The following definitions are adopted from [17]. The arrival 
time of the signal at node v, denoted by ta(v), is the latest time 
when the signal at node v reaches its final stable state.  
( )
( ) max [ ( ) ( , )]
a a d
u FI v
t v t u t u v
∈
= +
                                (1) 
    The required time of the signal at node u, denoted by tr(u), is 
the earliest time when the signal at node v is required to be stable. 
tr(u) can also be calculated recursively by (2).  
( )
( ) min [ ( ) ( , )]
r r d
v FO u
t u t v t u v
∈
= −
                              (2) 
The slack of a node v, denoted by ts(v), is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
s r a
t v t v t v= −                                                     (3) 
III. PROPOSED IP WATERMARKING SCHEME  
A. Watermark Insertion 
 An arbitrary length binary signature, W is encrypted using a 
public key cryptosystem (PKC) and then reduced by a message 
digest (MD) to a constant length sequence, We. To maximally 
utilize the embedding capacity of a design in incremental 
technology mapping, We is embedded into an originally 
optimized circuit generated by a logic synthesis tool with a cell 
library. This cover design is called the master design, G.  
 To minimize and isolate the topology perturbations to small 
regions of selected cells in technology mapping, disjoint closed 
cones instead of max cones are used as watermark hosts. There 
must be at least one substitutable template for any cell in a 
selected cone to enable remapping. There must also have enough 
spatially uncorrelated closed cones to reduce the odds that a 
randomly selected cone coincides with the watermark hosts. To 
provide a pool of fair candidates, each cell in the master design is 
first expanded to a disjoint closed cone of distance-τ, where τ  is 
empirically determined based on the circuit complexity, the 
watermark length and the cell library resources.     
 Fig. 2 shows the procedure to expand a cell, v, into a simple 
or complex closed cone of distance-τ. It can be implemented by 
a depth first traversal from v to include all its predecessors into 
Cv until the distance from the predecessors to v is τ, or any PI or 
implicit output node is met. When an implicit output node is 
encountered, either a simple or complex closed cone is to be 
generated. As multi-vertex mapping requires more effort to 
preserve the timing constraints, to justify for a complex cone, all 
implicit output nodes of the closed cone must have greater slacks 
than node v. Therefore, a complex cone, Cv1v2…vn of distance-τ is 
generated only if the following criterion is met.  
 ( ) ( )1 1 2 1( ),s i s i v v vn it v t v v FO C v v> ∀ ∈ ≠                            (4) 
where v1 is the cell to be expanded into a distance-τ closed cone.  
 
disjoint_closed_cone(v, τ) { 
    Cv = {v};  
for each (u ∈
 
 FI(Cv) and d(u, v) ≤ τ and  u is unmasked) { 
  if (u ≠ PI )  {mask(u); Cv = Cv ∪ {u}; } 
  flag = 1; 
  for each (x ∈ FO(u) and x ∉  Cv)  
             if ( ts(x) ≤ ts(v) or x is masked) {  
      unmask(u); Cv = Cv −{u}; flag = 0; break; } 
  if (flag =1) {mask(FO(u)); Cv = Cv ∪ FO(u); } 
}  
    if (Cv is trivial) return ∅; else return Cv; 
} 
Figure 2: Generation of distance-τ disjoint closed cone. 
As an example, consider node v of Fig. 1. For τ = 2, the 
complex closed cone, Cv,x, is generated if ts(x) > ts(v). Otherwise, 
node u is excluded and a simple closed cone, Cv’ is generated. 
As the embedding capacity is limited by the ability of a 
design to preserve its timing constraints in remapping, to 
maximally utilize the available embedding capacity for robust 
watermarking, a metric is developed to formally qualify the 
disjoint closed cones generated for watermark embedding. The 
slack of a cone, Cv = ts(v) provides a global view of the margin 
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max cone rooted at v.  However, a distance-τ closed cone, Cv, 
can preclude cells in the critical path of the max cone of v that are 
further than distance τ from v. To determine how well a closed 
cone, Cv preserves its output timing, we can remap only Cv of G 
to obtain a remapped solution, G’. The sustainability of a closed 
cone Cv is defined as:  
 
 




t v t v t vS C
t v t v
′∆ −
= + = +                                          (5) 
where ta(v) and ( )at v′ are the arrival times of the same node v 
in G and G’, respectively. We add a bias of one to the fractional 
delay so that when S(Cv) = 1, the original slack is retained, hence 
the term slack sustainability. Timing is improved by remapping 
if S(Cv) > 1 and aggravated if  S(Cv) < 1. 
 A re-synthesis is needed for each closed cone to evaluate its 
sustainability. To increase the efficiency, a correlated metric to 
the sustainability is statically derived from the master design 
without the need for the physical re-synthesis process.  









= ∈ = ∈ +∑  (6) 
where |FI(v)| is the number of fanin nodes of v and  
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             (7) 
 δ(v,u) accounts for the fractional delay a cell v contributes to 
its critical path through its fanin node, u. 0 < Ŝ(Cv) ≤ 1. The 
recursion of Ŝ(u) terminates at u = FI(Cv), and Ŝ(u) = 0 
∀u∈FI(Cv). If Cv is a max cone, Ŝ(Cv) = 1. The higher the Ŝ(Cv), 
the better the closed cone preserves its timing slack upon 
remapping. The greater the slack, the easier the delay constraint 
is met by remapping. The headroom of a closed cone is thus 
defined as: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )ˆv s vw C t v S C= ×                      (8) 
To qualify closed cones for watermark embedding, an 
empirical threshold, wT is defined such that all cones with 
headroom less than wT are pruned. To reduce the probability of 
qualifying closed cones that could adversely affect the 
performance of the watermarked design, wT is judiciously set to 
α time the minimum slack of all path groups of G.   
{ }min ( ( ))T s iiw t PO Gα= ×                      (9) 
    As the excess slacks on less critical path groups are expected 
to be traded for the diminished slacks on more critical path 
groups, α provides the trade-off control of the embedding 
capacity of a design and its watermarked solution’s timing 
specification.  
    Each qualified closed cone with w(Cv) ≥ wT is uniquely 
identified. To obfuscate the locality of the watermark, m 
qualified closed cones are randomly selected by a 
cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator 
seeded with the m-bit encrypted watermark, We. This keyed 
one-way function ensures that with high probability a different 
set of closed cones will be selected when the bitstream in We is 
permuted. To embed a logic ‘1’, a selected closed cone is 
coerced to remap by prohibiting the use of one randomly 
selected template inside the cone. To embed a logic ‘0’, one 
template of the selected cone is preserved. The selected 1- and 
0-watermarked cones are stored in Q1 and Q0, and their 
designated forbidden and preserved templates are stored in TP1 
and TP0, respectively, for watermark recovery. The watermarked 
solution, G’ is generated by remapping only Q1 and Q0 of G 
according to their template constraints, TP1 and TP0, 
respectively. The algorithm for watermark insertion is shown in 
Fig. 3. 
 
watermark_insert(G, Lib, W, K, τ, α) { 
 Compute and store timing information of ts, ta in G. 
 i = 1; Initialize disjoint cone array, Q; 
 for each (v ∈ G ) { 
  Q[i] = disjoint_closed_cone(v, τ); 
  if (Q[i] ≠ ∅) { cone_id[i]  = identifier of v; i = i + 1; } 
 } 
 wT = threshold(α, G); Q = qualify_closed_cone(Q, wT); 
 We = MD(PKC(W, K)); m = |We|; q = |Q|;  
 Initialize array TP1, TP0, Q1 and Q0; 
 index[1..m] = pseudo_random_generator(We, q); 
 for (i = 1 to m)  { 
  if (We[i] =1) { 
  TP1 = TP1 ∪ any template in Q[index[i]]; Q1 = Q1 ∪ Q[index[i]]; 
  mark the selected Q[index[i]] and its forbidden template in G; 
 } else { 
  TP0 = TP0 ∪ any template in Q[index[i]]; Q0 = Q0 ∪ Q[index[i]]; 
  mark the selected Q[index[i]] and its sentinel template in G; 
  }  
 }   
 G’ = remap(G, Q1, Q0, TP1, TP0, Lib); 
 return G’;   
} 
Figure 3: Watermark insertion by incremental technology mapping. 
 
B. Watermark Detection 
To prove the presence of watermark in an IP, the original 
CSP instance is recalled to verify that the additional constraints 
imposed are satisfied by the watermarked design [8]. This 
process exposes the grammar used to generate the constraints. 
Here we present another watermark detection method which 
possesses some features of fragile watermarking. Other designs 
similarly marked with the same signature will not become more 
vulnerable by the information divulged in this process. 
To facilitate the retrieval of the watermarked closed cones, 
correspondences between internal nets of the watermarked 
design and designated nets of the master design are identified by 
functional equivalence. The logic cones, C’ ∈ G’ and C ∈ G are 
said to be equivalent iff there exists a bijection between FI(C’) 
and FI(C), and between FO(C’) and FO(C). Let f(v) be the 
logical function of cell v, then C’ ≡ C  iff |FI(C’)| = |FI(C)| and 
|FO(C’)| = |FO(C)|, and ∃u∈FI(C’) such that f(u) ≡ f(v) 
∀v∈FI(C), and ∃u∈FO(C’) such that f(u) ≡ f(v) ∀v∈FO(C), 
where ‘≡’ denotes equivalence of logical functions.  
Since incremental technology mapping preserves the 
functionality of the interface ports of remapped cones, the logic 
functions of these nets can be retrieved from the fanin and fanout 
nodes of closed cones saved in the master design, G. To recover 
the watermarked cone C’ from a marked design, G’, nodes with 
the same logic functions are extracted. Let C’ ≡ C be a cone 
extracted from the watermarked design G’ with n fanins and k 
fanouts. f(WPi) ≡ f(Pj) for i, j = 1, 2, …, n+k, where WPi and Pj 
are the interface ports of C’ and C, respectively.  If C is used to 
embed a logic ‘0’ and the designated template is found in C’, a 
valid logic ‘0’ is retrieved. If C is used to embed a logic ‘1’ and 
the designated template is not found in C’, a valid logic ‘1’ is 
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recovered. Otherwise, the embedded bit has been corrupted. 
When equivalent fanin and fanout nodes of a watermarked cone 
cannot be found, it implies that either the cells within the cone or 
its neighboring cells have been modified. The authorship is 
proved by a perfect or high match between the recovered bit 
stream and the embedded watermark.  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The strength and robustness of an IP watermarking scheme 
are generally evaluated by the probability of coincidence, Pc,  
and the probability of removal, Pr. As it is difficult to 
unambiguously or unconditionally measure the credibility of IC 
IPPs in practice, we conservatively consider the potential high 
quality solutions that are less likely to violate the design 
constraints. The closed cones that span this subspace have been 
qualified by the threshold wT  in our watermarking flow. Thus, 
the probability of m uniquely labeled closed cones selected from 
q closed cones that satisfy the headroom constraints is 1 qmC . Let 
p0 and p1 be the probabilities that a template in the selected 
closed cone is preserved or changed in the remapping process, 
respectively.  Assume that We has an equal number of ‘1’ and ‘0’ 
bits, the probability that a solution carries the watermark by 
coincidence is given by: 








= ≈  
 
              (10) 
 Assume that it is equally probable that a designated template 
is extricated or preserved when a closed cone is remapped, p0 = 
p1 ≈ 0.5. From (10), it is obvious that increasing the signature 
length increases the watermark strength only if the design itself 
offers sufficient redundancy. Given a fixed signature length, m, a 
high exploitable redundancy space, q, also increases the 
watermark strength, provided that α  in (9) is judiciously 
selected to preserve the original timing constraints.  
 Since combinational circuit watermarking at logic synthesis 
level is not resilient against re-synthesis attack, the watermarked 
design is made available as technology-specific firm or hard IP. 
HDL codes that can be directly exploited for re-synthesis 
without substantial design and verification effort shall not be 
revealed. This makes node manipulation difficult for our method 
as it will affect the circuit timing even if the attacker can reverse 
engineer parts of the circuit netlist to recover some local 
functions with reasonable effort. To delete a large portion of the 
watermark bits and still preserve the solution quality, the 
attacker has to substantively perturb the watermarked netlist 
which results in a task of effort comparable to complete circuit 
optimization. Assume that a brute-force attack is performed to 
alter γ  cells at random followed by a timing analysis to ensure 
that the constraints are still satisfied with reasonable effort and 
without changing the circuit functionality. To simplify the 
analysis, we further presume that it needs only to alter any cell of 
a watermarked cone to successfully erase one watermark bit. 
The probability of erasing i bits of an m-bit watermark from a 
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  The probability of removing more than k (k ≤ m) watermark 
bits is given by: 
 ( ) ( )mr r
i k
P n k P n i
=
≥ = =∑                         (12)            
In the following experiments, we used Synopsys Design 
Compiler and its standard cell library to synthesize the circuits 
from ISCAS85, 89, 99 and LGSynth93 benchmark suites. All 
experiments were run on a 750–MHz Sun UltraSPARC-III with 
2 GB of memory running Solaris operating system. The master 
design of each circuit was obtained by using the timing 
constraints derived by the synthesis tool from the initially 
unconstrained designs. 100 different signatures of length m were 
used for the watermark embedding on each master design and 
the average percentage increases in the area (∆A), delay (∆D) 
and power (∆P) of the watermarked design over the master 
design were reported in Tables I and II. The columns ‘#cells’, 
‘N’, ‘q’, ‘Pc’ and ‘Pr’ are respectively the total number of 
combinational cells, the number of disjoint closed cones, the 
number of qualified closed cones with τ = 1, the probability of 
coincidence and the probability of successfully removing more 
than three quarters of the watermark bits by randomly altering m 
cells, i.e., k = 3m /4, γ = m. For ‘ex1010’ and ‘B22’, τ = 2 was 
also experimented with 64-bit and 128-bit signatures.  
  
TABLE I WATERMARKING RESULTS ON ISCAS BENCHMARKS 
Circuit #cells N q m ∆A(%) ∆D(%) ∆P(%) Pc Pr 
C2670 430 92 92 32 1.09 -2.11 0.97 4.10E-35 4.97E-09 
C5315 721 125 125 32 3.19 -0.43 1.80 3.76E-40 1.78E-12 
C7552 1069 243 243 64 1.79 -3.25 0.96 1.33E-79 3.30E-23 
C6288 1979 466 145 64 1.29 1.07 1.83 4.95E-62 1.61E-37 
S5378 734 140 84 32 1.02 0.74 0.56 1.49E-33 9.83E-14 
S9234 896 191 187 64 1.86 5.53 0.30 5.83E-71 8.65E-18 
64 0.30 -1.53 0.32 2.02E-125 3.87E-58 S38417 4927 1223 1127 128 0.65 0.00 0.44 4.63E-211 1.60E-85 
64 0.47 -1.81 -0.27 8.98E-126 8.29E-58 S38584 6520 1204 1141 128 0.73 -2.72 -0.12 8.66E-212 7.53E-85 
64 -0.10 -0.32 0.11 2.82E-129 1.22E-59 B22 5499 1313 1290 
128 0.07 1.87 0.11 5.37E-219 1.44E-88 
64 -0.11 -0.65 0.11 5.35E-126 3.08E-57 B22 
(τ = 2) 5499 1172 1150 128 0.01 -0.65 0.11 2.98E-212 1.08E-83 
64 0.40 -0.65 1.63 3.76E-118 2.66E-51 B21 3605 886 875 128 1.01 -0.65 2.04 5.29E-196 1.32E-71 
 
For a given master design, when more watermark bits were 
inserted, higher overheads were incurred. As the number of cells 
increases, the overheads diminish and become negligible. From 
Table II, it is also observed that the area and power overheads of 
the 128-bit watermarked ‘pdc’ were both less than 2.6%, and the 
timing was actually improved (negative percentage difference). 
For an even larger circuit ‘B22’, the area and power overheads 
reduced to only 0.07% and 0.11%, respectively, while the delay 
increased slightly by 1.87% for τ = 1. For τ = 2, the watermark 
introduced only a negligible 0.01% area overhead and the timing 
was improved. For most designs, as more watermark bits were 
inserted, lower Pc was obtained. If q > 1000, Pc < 10-200 for m = 
128. When a design possesses more than 600 disjoint cones, Pr < 
10−50 for m = 128. These results show that it is more difficult to 
remove a sufficient number of watermark bits successfully from 
a larger design. We have also experimented with k = m/2. It is 
found that the attacker can easily remove at least half of the 
watermark bits for a small number of watermarked circuits with 
N/m ≤ 2 and the Pr values remain very low when N/m > 3. When 
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N > 700 and m = 128, the probability of successfully removing 
more than 64 watermark bits is less than 10−19. In general, τ can 
be increased to lower the overhead of a watermarked solution. 
However, as τ increases, the number of qualified disjoint closed 
cones is reduced and Pc and Pr become higher.  
 
TABLE II  WATERMARKING RESULTS ON LGSYNTH93 BENCHMARKS 
Circuit #cells N q m ∆A(%) ∆D(%) ∆P(%) Pc Pr 
i7 269 61 61 16 10.85 -8.70 10.17 7.52E-20 1.38E-06 
i2 190 57 57 16 3.68 28.30 -2.11 2.64E-19 3.29E-06 
i9 239 30 30 16 6.34 5.70 12.73 1.05E-13 1.40E-02 
frg2 389 58 58 16 1.34 2.34 1.09 1.91E-19 2.63E-06 
rot 374 76 76 16 1.13 -1.64 1.98 1.41E-21 8.37E-08 
apex5 420 78 78 16 3.49 -0.80 5.72 8.87E-22 6.03E-08 
alu4 748 122 120 32 3.68 -1.48 4.35 1.70E-39 3.33E-12 
apex6 381 72 72 32 3.31 -0.80 0.47 8.16E-31 3.07E-06 
x3 430 96 91 32 2.34 0.00 0.85 6.28E-35 1.64E-09 
k2 542 100 76 32 1.74 0.47 0.64 8.64E-32 5.67E-10 
i8 416 80 74 32 2.59 -2.06 1.33 2.60E-31 1.93E-07 
dalu 356 93 93 32 3.06 4.74 0.67 2.69E-35 3.75E-09 
des 1680 267 173 64 0.89 17.84 1.05 2.69E-68 2.62E-25 
spla 2015 364 265 64 1.38 0.00 1.04 2.26E-82 3.85E-32 
mm30a 844 215 215 64 0.96 20.83 0.61 1.28E-75 1.84E-20 
pair 1087 314 314 64 2.69 5.59 3.70 1.08E-87 6.76E-29 
i10 1431 335 335 64 1.32 -0.48 1.48 1.07E-89 2.54E-30 
64 1.46 -0.62 1.60 2.48E-95 7.39E-37 pdc 2288 452 403 128 2.57 -1.85 2.18 2.75E-147 6.50E-42 
64 1.53 10.13 11.72 7.61E-130 1.09E-59 
ex1010 5411 1316 1316 128 2.05 10.97 16.27 3.66E-220 1.15E-88 
64 1.28 9.28 10.35 2.97E-124 1.52E-55 ex1010 
(τ = 2) 5411 1082 1082 128 1.90 10.97 15.70 1.18E-208 2.99E-80 
64 1.53 -6.29 0.00 6.32E-111 6.14E-49 
elliptic 3626 793 682 128 1.82 11.98 0.22 7.28E-181 8.88E-67 
      
In Table III, we compare the overheads of our watermarking 
method with two other methods in [10] and [11]. The 
comparison was performed by excerpting the results in [10] and 
[11] for the same benchmark circuits. In [10], irregular signature 
lengths were used. Two different signature lengths based on the 
cases of 4% and 8% of gates being constrained as 
pseudo-primary outputs [10] were used to compare the 
embedding overheads and Pc values with [10]. In [11], Pc was 
not evaluated. Thus only the area overhead was compared using 
the same watermark length equivalent to the number of 
additional constraints of [11]. An empty entry indicates 
unavailable result. It is found that for most designs, our method 
provides the strongest proof of authorship with lower overhead. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
    We presented a constraint-based watermarking method at the 
logic synthesis level for IP protection. In our approach, good 
localities for watermark insertion are identified based on the 
notion of slack sustainability. The formal qualification of 
hosting cones, in conjunction with an incremental technology 
mapping, has several distinct advantages. First, the original 
design constraints can be satisfied with very low embedding 
overhead. Second, the signature length can be adaptively tailored 
to the embedding capacity of a design to optimize the ownership 
proof, watermark obscurity and resilience with low impact on 
circuit quality. Third, the existence of the watermark can be 
explicitly detected by a direct extraction method by comparing 
the master design and the watermarked design. The correlation 
check also provides the cue on attacker’s attempt of obliteration. 
The experimental results show that our method generally 
performs better than other watermarking methods at the logic 
synthesis level in terms of the overhead and watermark strength 
under the same signature length. The results also indicate that the 
probability of successful random obliteration descends rapidly 
with increased disjoint cones to signature length ratio. There is 
potential to integrate our method with dynamic watermarking at 
higher design level [15] to offer greater flexibility to reuse the 
watermarked IP cores with low risk of successful attacks.    
 
TABLE III COMPARISON OF LOGIC SYNTHESIS WATERMARKING METHODS 
Proposed [10] [11] Circuit M 
∆A (%) Pc ∆A (%) Pc ∆A (%) 
18 14.83 2.91E-21 2.88 4.22E-14  i7 36 15.91 1.65E-28 1.44 6.98E-28  
22 6.62 6.83E-23 10.74 1.87E-13  i2 43 8.26 1.48E-26 26.45 1.00E-23  
i9 19 6.74 3.49E-14 8.57 2.33E-14  
25 2.44 7.14E-34 6.82 5.84E-11  
alu4 49 4.18 1.37E-49 11.82 3.34E-20  
14 0.24 6.02E-18   2.04 
21 0.52 1.43E-22 2.98 3.01E-10  frg2 
41 4.93 2.30E-27 8.61 4.15E-18  
20 1.88 8.75E-25   1.53 
24 2.27 1.58E-27 4.53 2.73E-12  rot 
48 3.89 7.13E-36 8.36 1.04E-22  
20 3.75 3.06E-24   11.24 
26 3.75 5.40E-28 5.37 6.41E-16  apex6 
51 6.58 5.75E-34 10.74 2.29E-29  
19 2.08 8.34E-26   2.55 
29 2.49 2.63E-33 7.27 9.51E-16  C2670 
58 4.75 1.94E-43 12.42 7.22E-29  
18 1.61 8.08E-25   5.92 
28 1.68 1.67E-32 7.89 5.93E-16  x3 
55 2.03 9.70E-43 14.66 5.12E-29  
33 2.02 3.24E-32 2.91 1.84E-10  k2 66 2.83 1.42E-32 6.05 3.00E-19  
15 2.28 1.67E-20 
 
 0.86 
34 3.46 4.24E-32 -4.45 1.06E-10  i8 
67 6.77 3.77E-30 -10.83 4.53E-23  
43 4.40 1.81E-40 4.19 1.07E-19  dalu 86 8.24 1.36E-36 11.26 3.88E-36  
55 4.53 2.24E-53 6.30 2.92E-32  C5315 110 7.57 8.50E-53 14.57 4.40E-59  
19 -0.27 1.46E-36   0.38 
58 1.95 3.39E-82 6.73 3.99E-31  pair 
115 4.36 1.34E-123 14.62 6.88E-57  
C6288 97 1.93  9.36E-69 10.72 7.01E-51  
98 3.68 4.15E-100 8.25 1.48E-52  C7552 196 6.32 2.27E-110 17.93 4.42E-96  
des 112 2.12 5.23E-82 0.79 3.21E-55  
119 2.24 7.27E-130 4.26 5.98E-50  i10 238 3.88 1.34E-158 8.67 4.48E-94  
apex5 4 1.48 4.38E-08   0.38 
S9234 19 0.38 4.09E-32   2.61 
S5378 20 1.73 8.88E-26   2.60 
mm30a 20 -0.04 1.30E-34   1.36 
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